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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann 
§78A-4-103. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: 
Mr. Walker misstates the proper standard of review for his first issue in this 
appeal when he states a Clear Error and Correctness standard. The proper standard of 
review is that the Appeals Court will reverse the trial court's Rule 60(b) ruling only when 
there has been an abuse of discretion. "'A trial court has discretion in determining 
whether a movant has shown [rule 60(b) grounds], and this court will reverse the trial 
court's ruling only when there has been an abuse of discretion.'" Ostler v Buhler, 957 
P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998) 
In the stated standard of review for his first issue, Walker cites to Swallow v 
Kennardior the authority behind his statement. However, his statement is misleading 
because he selected only one sentence, plucked from the center of, and completely out 
of context with the entire paragraph, which states: 
"'A trial court has discretion in determining whether a movant has shown [rule 
60(b) grounds], and this court will reverse the trial court's ruling only when there has 
been an abuse of discretion."' Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT 
App 110,1J9, 2 P.3d 451 (alteration in original) (quoting Ostler v Buhler, 957 P.2d 
205, 206 (Utah 1998)); see also Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, U 7, 104 P.3d 1198. 
More specifically, in the context of a denial of a rule 60(b) motion, "[w]e review a 
district court's finding of fact under a clear error standard of review," Menzies v. 
Galetka, 2006 UT 81, H 55, 150 P.3d 480 (citing Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, H 1 n. 
1, 123 P.3d 416), while "[w]e review a district court's conclusions of law for 
correctness, affording the trial court no deference," id. If 55 (citing Richins v Delbert 
Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah Ct. App.)). Further, although the 
existence of a meritorious defense may be a factor, "[a]n appeal of a Rule 60(b) 
order addresses only the propriety of the denial or grant of relief. The appeal does 
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not, at least in most cases, reach the merits of the underlying judgment from which 
relief was sought." Franklin Covey Client Sales, 2000 UT App 110, U 19, 2 P.3d 451 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Swallow v Kennard, 183 P.3d 1052,1056-1057 
(Utah App. 2008) 
Because Walker took his standard out of context, he misstated the proper 
standard of review for his first issue. 
ISSUE II: 
Mr. Walker also misstates the proper standard of review for his second issue 
when he states a Clear Error and Correctness standard by again citing to Swallow v 
KennardTor the authority behind his statement. Because Walker again took his 
standard out of context, he again misstated the proper standard of review for his second 
issue. 
More important, an appeal of a Rule 60(b) order addresses only the propriety of 
the denial or grant of relief. The appeal does not reach the merits of the underlying 
judgment from which relief is sought. See Swallow v Kennard, 183 P.3d 1052, 1057 
(Utah App. 2008). Therefore, the appellee Christensen objects to Walker's entire 
statement of issue number two to include the stated standard of review because as 
written, the issue is no more than a backdoor attempt to have this court review the 
issues involved with the trial court's grant of Christensen's motion for summary 
judgment, rather than a review of the Rule 60(b) ruling that is the subject of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Throughout his brief, Mr. Walker has failed to marshal the evidence available to 
him in the Court record. He likewise did not marshal the evidence available to him 
through the transcript of the hearing he complains of by choosing not to request a copy 
of the transcript. 
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On September 26, 2007, the Bolinder Company, Inc. filed suit against Steven 
Walker, dba B&W Plumbing, dba Fineline Development to collect approximately 
$4,200.00 from Steven Walker for construction materials he had ordered and received 
from but for which he had not paid Bolinder. R. 6. 
On October 12, 2007 Walker, when he filed his answer, deleted the dba B&W 
Plumbing dba Fineline Development designation from his line of the case title and 
named Russell Christensen, dba Fineline Development as a Third Party Defendant. 
R.14. Walker alleged in his Third-party Complaint that Christensen had obligations 
related to the Bolinder Company under a certain agreement dated February 15, 2005. 
R.13. Walker's complaint went on to falsely allege that Christensen, not Walker had 
applied for an account and ordered material from Bolinder. R.12. 
Contra to the statements on page 3 of Walker's brief, that Christensen filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment on December 16, 2009, Christensen filed a Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment with a supporting memorandum on December 16, 2008. 
R.35. On this same date, Christensen filed the Affidavit of Garry Bolinder, an owner of 
the Bolinder Company, in which Bolinder stated that: "In regards to this delivery of 
product, I never conducted any business with, nor have I ever sent a bill to Mr Russell 
Christensen, as claimed by Mr. Walker. My company provided the requested rock 
product to the land, purportedly owned by Mr. Steven Walker as requested by Mr. 
Walker and intends to be paid by Mr. Walker." R.40. 
Contra to the claim made by Walker on pages 3 and 4 of his brief, that he filed 
his Memorandum in Opposition on January 9, 2009, Walker filed his Memorandum in 
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Opposition with the court on January 12, 2009, no less than 5 days after an objection 
was due under U.R.Civ.P. Rule 7. R.71. 
On August 6, 2009, Mr. Egan filed his Substitution of Counsel with the Court. 
R.91. 
Contra to Walker's claim that the trial court scheduled Bolinder's motion for 
hearing on August 7, 2009 as stated on pages 4 and 5 of Walker's brief, the clerk of the 
Third District Court mailed a document on August 7, 2009 entitled "Notice of Motion for 
Summary Judgment" to the counsel of record for Mr. Walker, and to the counsel for 
Christensen and Bolinder. Said Notice announced that a hearing had been scheduled 
on August 31, 2009 for "Motion for Summary Judgment." Add. "B", R.129. 
While Walker's statement on page 5 of his brief that the "notice of hearing makes 
no reference to Christensen's Motion for Summary Judgment" is technically true, Walker 
failed to mention in his brief that the Notice for Motion of Summary Judgmenl also 
makes no reference to Bolinder. Add. "B", R.129. 
Once again, Walker failed to mention in his brief that on August 24, 2009, his 
attorney filed a Combined Motion and Memorandum to Strike Summary Judgment 
Hearing or, Alternatively, to Reschedule. R.116. 
Walker also fails to mention in his brief that the minutes for the August 31s t 
hearing state: "Mr. Egan is not present, he was told the hearing would not be continued 
if it was not stipulated to by opposing counsel. Mr. Egan motion to strike or reschedule 
was not filed timely.. ." Walker also left out that the Court's minutes state "Mr. Walker 
objects to hearing today due to his counsel not being present, and to fees being 
awarded." Add. "B", R.129. 
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While Walker's statement on page 5 of his brief that".. . neither counsel for 
Walker nor Christensen were present at the hearing" is technically true, Walker again 
failed to tell this Court that Christensen's counsel was absent due to a head injury 
suffered the previous day, while Walker's counsel had elected to remain on vacation 
rather than attend the hearing. R. 217. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED 
WALKER'S RULE 60(b) MOTION BECAUSE (1) THE COURT SCHEDULED 
AND CONDUCTED A HEARING ON THE TWO MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TOGETHER TO CONSERVE JUDICIAL RESOURCES SUA 
SPONTE AND (2) WALKER FAILED TO MEET ANY OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
OF RULE 60(b). 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Walker's Rule 60(b) motion 
because (1) there is no rule that bars a court from deciding such a motion sua sponte 
without a "notice to submit" having been filed with the court; (2) in its ruling, the trial 
court explained in detail why Walker's several claims of being denied the ability to 
respond to Christensen's motion were all defeated by Walker's own admissions and 
lack of due diligence; and (3) Walker's complaint that the trial court did not reference the 
factual issues surrounding Christensen's motion should have been the subject of a 
direct appeal from the award of Christensen's summary judgment, not contained in this 
Rule 60(b) appeal. 
In his brief, Walker not only failed to address how his Rule 60(b) motion provided 
the trial court with adequate evidence that his request met any of the requirements of 
Rule 60(b) but he also failed to marshal any of the evidence available for this Court to 
adequately review the propriety of the trial court's denial of the requested relief. 
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II. WALKER'S ARGUMENT ON ISSUE TWO IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE 
COURT BECAUSE THE COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO CONSIDER 
FACTUAL ISSUES PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS 
WHEN RULING ON A RULE 60(b) MOTION. 
Walker's statement of the disposition of the trial court on page 4 of his brief and his 
conclusion on page 12 of his brief unambiguously limit the focus of this appeal to his 
Rule 60(b) Motion of Relief from Judgment. An appeal of a Rule 60(b) motion order 
addresses only the propriety of the denial or grant of relief under the rule. Therefore, 
his issues and his arguments in support thereof, are likewise limited in focus to his 
60(b) motion. His entire argument on issue two is completely outside the bounds of this 
focus and therefore improperly before the court and should not be considered. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED 
WALKER'S RULE 60(b) MOTION BECAUSE (1) THE COURT SCHEDULED 
AND CONDUCTED A HEARING ON THE TWO MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TOGETHER TO CONSERVE JUDICIAL RESOURCES SUA 
SPONTE AND (2) WALKER FAILED TO MEET ANY OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
OF RULE 60(b). 
Mr. Walker's first argument can be divided into three subparts, each of which fails 
for the following reasons. 
First, Walker claims that Christensen's motion was not properly before the court 
because Christensen had not submitted a notice to submit for decision pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 7(d). Although Walker's claim that Christensen did not 
file a Notice to Submit on his Motion for Summary Judgment is true, the motion was 
none the less properly before the Court. As Walker himself points out on page 8 of his 
brief, this Court has recognized that trial courts have the discretion to review such 
motions without a notice to submit for decision being filed with the Court. 
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"While a Court may refrain from addressing a matter that is not submitted for 
decision...nothing in this rule or any other rule bars a court from deciding such a matter 
sua sponte." Scott v Majors, 980 P.2d 214, 217 (Utah App. 1999). In this case, that is 
precisely what the trial court did by scheduling both pending motions for summary 
judgment for the same hearing in order to conserve court resources. While the Scott 
case discussed Utah Code of Judicial Administration 4-501 (1)(d), which has been 
repealed, the same language is now embodied in the U.R.Civ.P. Rule 7(d). 
Walker's brief suggests that this Court interpret the last sentence of U.R.Civ.P. 
Rule 7(d), which states "If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted 
for decision" as a prohibition on the trial court's consideration of and ruling on 
Christensen's Motion for Summary Judgment. However, that self-serving focus on one 
shallow interpretation of the language completely ignores this Court's previous ruling in 
Scott, that nothing in this rule or any other rule bars a court from deciding such a matter 
sua sponte. 
Walker's argument that even though the trial court had the discretion to review 
Christensen's motion, it abused its discretion in two ways; (1) because it did not provide 
notice of the hearing on Christensen's motion; and (2) that it decided the motion when 
counsel for neither party was present is defeated by the ruling of the Scott Court. "Once 
a motion is properly made, and other parties to the litigation have had the opportunity 
provided by the rules of civil procedure to respond, the court may act at its convenience 
to decide the matter." Scott v Majors, 980 P.2d 214, 217 (Utah App. 1999). 
More important, Walker's claims on page 8 of his brief, that the trial court never 
scheduled nor provided notice of the hearing on Christensen's Motion are simply false. 
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Contra to Walker's claim, on August 7, 2009, the clerk of the Third District Court 
mailed a document entitled "Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment" to the counsel of 
record for Walker and to counsel for Bolinder and Christensen. Add. "B", R.129. While 
Walker's claim that the notice of hearing makes no reference to Christensen's Motion 
for Summary Judgment as stated on page 5 of his brief is true, Walker fails to tell this 
court that the notice made no reference to Bolinder's motion either. Add. "B", R.129. 
Therefore, Walker received every bit as much notice about the hearing as Christensen's 
attorney received. 
Walker also argues that the court abused its discretion by making a decision on 
the motion when neither parties' counsel was present at the hearing that was conducted 
on August 31, 2009. While it is true that neither parties counsel was present, Walker 
intentionally fails to mention to this Court that Christensen's counsel was not there due 
to suffering a head injury the day before the hearing. R. 217. Walker also did not 
marshal the evidence available in the trial court's ruling denying Walker's 60(b) motion, 
in that he failed to mention to this Court the trial court's discussion in great detail of why 
it found that Walker's counsel's choice to remain on vacation and not attend the hearing 
did not constitute due diligence. Add. "A", R.223 - 225. Walker's brief also did not 
inform this Court that not only did Walker and his attorney each personally know about 
the August 31st hearing, but that on August 24, 2009, his attorney filed a "Combined 
Motion and Memorandum to Strike Summary Judgment Hearing or, Alternatively, to 
Reschedule" which the trial court ruled on as untimely. Add. "B", R.129. 
It is also problematic to Walker's appeal that his brief provides no explanation 
whatsoever as to why Walker's Counsel failed to attend the August 31s t hearing to 
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address Bolinder's Motion for Summary judgment for which he admits he had received 
a proper Notice of Hearing and for which he admits he knew a proper Notice to Submit 
had been filed with the Court. R. 259 - 258. 
As discussed in detail in the trial court's 60(b) ruling, Mr. Egan's voluntary choice 
to continue his vacation rather than tend to the known litigation needs of his client are 
simply not the basis for the grant of relief under a Rule 60(b) motion. 
As a sub issue, Walker also intentionally fails to tell this court that he was 
personally present for the hearing and argued on the merits of the motions. Add. "B", 
R.129. 
Mr. Walker was in the court room alone because his attorney chose to go on 
vacation even after the court directly told Mr. Egan that the hearing would be held on 
August 31, 2009 as scheduled. Add. "B", R.129. Although constantly represented by 
counsel, Mr. Walker has appeared pro-se and made argument before the trial court on 
more than just this occasion, such as on July 21, 2008. R.25. 
Concerning the third subpart of the first issue, Walker's complaint on the bottom 
of page 9 of his brief, that the trial court did not reference the factual issues surrounding 
Christensen's motion in the Rule 60(b) order, seems to be a complaint that the trial 
court did exactly what was required of it by Rule 60(b). 
"Rule 60(b)(1) permits the trial court... to relieve a party from a final judgment if 
the party demonstrates 'mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."' 
(emphasis in original). Fisher v. Bybee, 104 P.3d 1198, 1200 (Utah 2004). "An inquiry 
into the merits of the underlying judgment or order must be the subject of a direct 
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appeal from that judgment or order." 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal 
Practice § 60.68[3] (3d ed. 1999). 
The trial court focused on the Rule 60(b) reasons that Walker had presented in 
his motion and discussed in detail its reasoning for denying Walker's request for relief, 
which is precisely what is required by Rule 60(b). Add. "A", R. 230 - 222. In his brief 
before this Court, Walker misplaces his expectation that the trial court should have 
considered the facts surrounding Christensen's summary judgment motion, because 
that appeal must be brought before this Court on a direct appeal of the summary 
judgment ruling, not within an appeal of the trial court's Rule 60(b) ruling. 
II. WALKER'S ARGUMENT ON ISSUE TWO IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE 
COURT BECAUSE THE COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO CONSIDER 
FACTUAL ISSUES PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS 
WHEN RULING ON A RULE 60(b) MOTION. 
Mr. Walker's argument on issue two is not properly before the court. To prevail 
on a Rule 60(b) motion, Walker must show that the summary judgment was entered 
against him through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, or any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. U.R.Civ.P. Rule 60(b)(1) /(6). 
Walker's entire second argument completely fails to address any of the six 
possible reasons a Rule 60(b) motion could have been, but was not granted by the trial 
court. Instead, Walker tries to get this court to improperly focus on factual issues 
concerned with Christensen's previous motion for summary judgment, not on the issues 
concerned with the requirements of Rule 60(b) that Walker had failed to meet before the 
trial court. 
An appeal of a Rule 60(b) motion order addresses only the propriety of the denial 
or grant of relief under the rule. As stated in Swallow v Kennard:"... although the 
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existence of a meritorious defense may be a factor, 'an appeal of a Rule 60(b) order 
addresses only the propriety of the denial or grant of relief. The appeal does not, at 
least in most cases, reach the merits of the underlying judgment from which relief was 
sought/ Franklin Covey Client Sales, 2000 UT App 110,1119, 2 P.3d 451 (internal 
quotation marks omitted)." Swallow v Kennard, 183 P.3d 1052, 1056-1057 (Utah App. 
2008). 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has stated "[t]he outcome of Rule 60(b) 
motions are rarely vulnerable to attack. We grant broad discretion to the trial court's 
rule 60(b) rulings because most are equitable in nature, saturated with facts, and call 
upon judges to apply fundamental principles of fairness that do not easily lend 
themselves to appellate review." Fisher v. Bybee, 104 P.3d 1198, 1200 (Utah 2004). 
As discussed in great detail in the trial court's ruling, Walker failed for various 
reasons, to include Walker's lack of due diligence, to show the trial court that the 
judgment was entered against him through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect, or any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment as required by U.R.Civ.P. Rule 60(b)(1) and (6). Add. "A" R. 230-222. 
As discussed in Franklin Covey Client Sales, at 457, an appeal from a denied 
Rule 60(b) motion should not be allowed to serve as a "back door" to a direct appeal 
of the previously granted summary judgment. Here, Walker's second issue is 
nothing other than the attempt to have this Court re-look at the Christensen 
summary judgment via the back door. The improper focus of this appeal of the 
denial of Walker's Rule 60(b) motion is evidenced by the very issues Walker has 
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presented in his second argument. Thus, his entire argument on issue two is not 
properly before the court. 
Had Walker timely appealed the entry of Christensen's summary judgment, 
then the factual issues surrounding that judgment could have properly been placed 
before this Court for review. However, because Walker failed to make that appeal 
and the time to appeal the summary judgment has now long since passed, the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment to Christensen is no longer reviewable. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly denied Walker's Rule 60(b) motion because Walker failed 
to adequately show that the judgment was entered against him through mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, or any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment pursuant to U.R.Civ.P Rule 60(b). 
The three reasons Walker stated as justification for this Court to review the denial 
of his Rule 60(b) motion simply do not address the requirements of Rule 60(b) and/or 
how his motion established or failed to establish the grounds required for the trial court 
to grant his motion. Therefore, the appeal before this court must be denied. 
Dated this2s3 day of August. 
* Jaime Topham 
Attorney for Appellee 
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I hereby certify that on this ^ 5 day of August, 2010,1 served a copy of the 
forgoing document and accompanying PDF disc, by depositing a true and correct copy 
thereof in the United States Mails, addressed to: 
Sean N. Egan 
Parkside Tower - Suite 950 
215 South State Street 
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j&ime Topham 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOLINDER COMPANY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN K. WALKER, an 
individual, 
Defendant. 
STEVEN K. WALKER, an 
individual, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RUSSELL CHRISTENSEN dba 
FINELINE DEVELOPMENT, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. : 070301570 
Judge: Stephen L. Henriod 
The above matter is before the Court on Defendant and Third-
Party Plaintiff's ("Defendant") Notice to Submit RE: Walker's 
Motion for Relief from Summary Judgment. Having reviewed 
Defendant's Motion and Plaintiff's Opposition thereto, and, 
having heard oral arguments on the matter Monday, September 2, 
(400 "ft" 
Ptl 
2009, the Court makes the following ruling. 
The district court judge has "considerable discretion under 
Rule 60(b) in granting or denying a motion to set aside a 
judgment." Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986) (per 
curiam) (citations omitted); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
While a ucourt should be generally indulgent toward setting a 
judgment aside where there is reasonable justification or excuse 
for the defendant's failure to answer and when timely application 
is made," Jd. (citations omitted) (emphasis added), such 
indulgence will not be granted when the party has failed to 
exercise "due diligence [as would] a reasonably prudent person 
under similar circumstances." Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial 
Commln, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
BCW Enterprises, Inc. v. Lund, No. 981322-CA, 1999 Utah App. 
LEXIS 332, *2-4 (Utah Ct. App. June 24, 1999) 1I is factually on 
point in part, with the matter before this Court. The court held 
"it was not reasonable for Lund to assume that negotiations 
between him and plaintiff's attorney excused him from responding 
to plaintiff's complaint." (citation omitted). The court 
concluded that while Lund's failure to answer the complaint was 
1
 Utah R. App. P. 30(f) provides in relevant part: u [U]npublished 
decisions of the Court of Appeals issued on or after October 1, 1998, may be 
cited as precedent in all courts of the State." (2007). 
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neglectful, it was not excusable. Id. The Utah Court of Appeals 
has explained, " [I]f counsel renders deficient performance in the 
context of a civil proceeding, regrettable as it is, generally 
does not give rise [to a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel].'" Peterson v. Peterson, No. 20050472-CA, 2006 Utah App. 
LEXIS 204, *6 (Utah Ct. App. May 18, 2006)2 (quotation omitted). 
Similarly, Andrew M. Wadsworth, Defendant's prior counsel, 
maintains that he was never informed that settlement discussions 
were over or that an opposition to Plaintiff's Motion was needed. 
(Walker's Mem. In Supp. p. 3, no. 7). Mr. Wadsworth is a 
licensed attorney and therefore, it is reasonable to consider 
that he is familiar with civil procedure. Furthermore, Mr. 
Wadsworth does not claim that he ever made attempts to contact 
Plaintiff's counsel to learn of the status of the settlement 
proceedings. Additionally, it was never disputed that Mr. 
Wadsworth did not acknowledge receipt of Plaintiff's Motion or, 
that Mr. Wadsworth requested extensions for filing on two 
separate occasions. (PL's Resp. To Def.'s Obj . To Notice to 
Submit PL's Mot. For Summ. J. 1). 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b) in relevant 
part, provides that relief from a judgment or order may be 
2
 See n.l. 
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granted on the following b a s i s : Ml) mistake, inadvertence, 
su rp r i se , or excusable neglec t ; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due di l igence could not have been discovered in time to 
move for a new t r i a l under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether 
heretofore denominated i n t r i n s i c or e x t r i n s i c ) , misrepresentat ion 
or other misconduct of an adverse par ty ; (4) the judgment i s 
void; (5) the judgment has been s a t i s f i e d , re leased, or 
discharged, or a p r io r judgment upon which i t i s based has been 
reversed or otherwise vacated, or i t i s no longer equi tab le tha t 
the judgment should have prospect ive app l ica t ion ; or (6) any 
other reason jus t i fy ing r e l i e f from the operat ion of the 
judgment." (2009). 
The Utah Supreme Court in te rpre ted the terms mistake, 
excusable neglect3 , and surpr i se to "require due d i l igence on the 
par t of the p a r t i e s and t h e i r a t to rneys . " Rukavina v. Sprague, 
There a r e four non-exc lus ive f a c t o r s r e l e v a n t t o a de t e rmina t i on of 
excusable n e g l e c t : u (1) the danger of p r e jud i ce t o t he nonmoving p a r t y , (2) 
the l eng th of t h e de lay and i t s p o t e n t i a l impact on j u d i c i a l p roceed ings , (3) 
the reason for t h e de lay , i nc lud ing whether i t was w i t h i n the r easonab le 
c o n t r o l of the movant, and (4) whether the movant ac t ed in good f a i t h . " 
S e r r a t o v . Utah T r a n s i t Auth. , 2000 UT App 299, ^[9, 13 P.3d 616 ( c i t a t i o n s 
o m i t t e d ) . While t he se f a c t o r s a re not d i s p o s i t i v e , they a re h e l p f u l i n 
de termining whether excusable n e g l e c t occurred . Id ; see a l s o I n t e r s t a t e 
Excavat ing v . Agla Dev. Corp. , 611 P.2d 369, 372 (Utah 1980)(Hal l , 
d i s s e n t i n g ) ( " T h i s Court has p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d t h a t n e g l e c t , t o be excusab le , 
must occur d e s p i t e the e x e r c i s e of due d i l i g e n c e , ( i n t e r n a l c i t a t i o n omit ted) 
Other j u r i s d i c t i o n s have defined excusable n e g l e c t as xsuch as might have 
been the ac t of a reasonably prudent person under t h e same c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ' 
( footnote o m i t t e d ) . I t has a l s o been held t h a t s imple c a r e l e s s n e s s does not 
r i s e t o the s t a t u t o r y s tandard , ( footnote o m i t t e d ) , nor do simple bus ines s 
d i f f i c u l t i e s which a l l e g e d l y p reven t the d e d i c a t i o n of adequate a t t e n t i o n t o 
the l i t i g a t i o n in ques t ion , ( footnote o m i t t e d ) " ) . 
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2007 UT App 331, % 3, 170 P.3d 1138 (citation omitted). Due 
diligence is defined as "conduct that is consistent with the 
manner in which a reasonably prudent attorney under similar 
circumstances would have acted." Id. (emphasis added). 
However, "a party who simply misunderstands or fails to predict 
the legal consequences of his deliberate acts cannot later, once 
the lesson is learned, turn back the clock to undo those 
mistakes." Jd. at \ 4 (quoting Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 
1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999)); see also Pelican Prod. Corp. v. 
Marino, 893 F.2d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir. 1990)("Carelessness by a 
litigant or his counsel does not afford a basis for relief under 
Rule 60(b) (1)") . 
The Utah Supreme Court explained: 
In order for defendant to be relieved from the 
default judgment, he must not only show that the 
judgment was entered against him through excusable 
neglect (or any other reason specified in Rule 60(b)), 
but he must also show that his motion to set aside the 
judgment was timely, and that he has a meritorious 
defense to the action. 
State by Utah State Pep!t of Social Servs. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 
1053, 1055-56 (Utah 1983)(citations omitted) ). A meritorious 
defense is defined as one: 
which sets forth specific and sufficiently detailed 
facts which, if proven, would have resulted in a 
judgment different from the one entered. By this 
standard, a defendant must . . . do more than merely 
dispute or deny the truth of [the] plaintiff!s 
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allegations; he must set forth specific facts showing 
meritorious defenses to those allegations in order to 
have the default judgment set aside. 
Erickson v. Schenkers Int'1 Forwarders, 882 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah 
1994) (quotations and citation omitted) 
However, where a defendant demonstrates indifference on his 
part and lack of diligence to prosecute, a default judgment will 
not be disturbed. See Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 
(Utah 1984). 
Mr. Wadsworth7s substitution of counsel was filed August 6, 
2 009, one day before the notice of hearing was issued by the 
Court. (Walker's Combined Mot. and Mem. For Relief p.3) . 
Moreover, Sean N. Egan, Defendant's current counsel, does not 
dispute that he received the notice of hearing. Id. In fact, 
Mr. Egan provides that he received the Court's notice from Mr. 
Wadsworth on August 14, 2009, thereby, notifying him of the 
August 31, 2 0 09, hearing date. Id. 
Additionally, although Mr. Egan maintains that he contacted 
the Clerk of the Court upon receipt of the notice, there is no 
dispute that Mr. Egan only made a single attempt to contact the 
Court. Id. 3-4. The Court did not return Mr. Egan's call until 
August 28, 2 0 09, at which time he was advised that if opposing 
counsel would stipulate to a continuance, the hearing could be 
rescheduled. JEd. at 4. At no time from August 14, 2 009, to 
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Friday, August 28, 2009, when the Court returned his call, did 
Mr. Egan attempt to contact opposing counsel to reschedule the 
hearing. Id. Rather than submitting a motion for continuance or 
contacting opposing counsel, Mr. Egan filed a Motion to Strike 
Summary Judgment or, Alternatively, to Reschedule the Hearing on 
August 19, 2009. Id. 
Mr. Egan claims that on Friday, August 28, 2009, he left a 
message for opposing counsel requesting a continuance. Id. On 
the following day, Mr. Egan left for a family vacation. Id. On 
Saturday, August 29, 2009, Mr. Egan asserts that he faxed 
opposing counsel with a Request for Continuance and an Order for 
the Court. Id. 
The Court finds that it is not unreasonable to consider that 
opposing counsel did not receive Mr. Egan's message and/or fax 
because the attempt to contact was made on Friday and Saturday. 
Moreover, the Court finds that Mr. Egan had ample opportunity 
from receipt of the notice of hearing on August 14, 2 009, to 
contact opposing counsel or submit a request for continuance 
rather than waiting until the weekend before a Monday hearing to 
submit such a request. Mr. Egan's actions therefore, do not 
constitute due diligence. See Valley Leasing, Div. of 
Intermountain Loan Corp. v. Houghton, 661 P.2d 959, 960 (Utah 
1983)("Mere inconvenience or the press of personal or business 
7 
affairs is not deemed as an excuse for failure to appear at 
trial.") 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's Motion is DENIED. 
This Minute Entry stands as the Order of the Court. No 
further Order is required. 
of M/ttUbkt* Dated this JQ day  /I/IW^'O^^. 2009 
BY THE COURT: 
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DISTRIC1^ :COURT JUDGE 
TK5b~ 
'^3^^^^""' 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry dated this_ 
/ 3 day ofhJoJernber 2009, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Gary Buhler 
P.O. Box 22 9 
Grantsville, UT 84029 
Sean N. Egan 
Parkside Tower, Suite 950 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Clerk Jot Court 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - TOOELE 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BOLINDER COMPANY INC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
STEVEN WALKER, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No: 070301570 PR 
Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD 
Date: August 31, 2009 
Clerk: nancyw 
PRESENT 
Defendant(s): STEVEN WALKER 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): GARY A BUHLER 
Audio 
Tape Count: 9:25 
HEARING 
COUNT: 9:25 
Mr. Egan is not present, he was told the hearing would not be 
continued if it was not stipulated to by opposing counsel. Mr. Egan 
motion to strike or reschedule was not filed timely. 
Mr. Buhler addresses Mr. Christensen and requests summary judgment 
in the amount of $3,640.00. 
Court orders summary judgment granted. 
Mr. Walker objects to hearing today due to his counsel not being 
present and to fees being awarded. 
Mr. Buhler to prepare the order for the court. 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 7(d) 
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party may file a 
"Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision shall state the date 
on which the motion was served, the date the opposing memorandum, if any, was 
served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has 
been requested. If no party files a request, the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On 
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in 
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) 
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit 
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
UCA 78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue 
all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
Addendum "C" 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, 
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other 
local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are 
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a 
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the 
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not 
limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, 
visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of 
the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination 
any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Addendum "C" 
